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In an article on the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell published in the
YALx LAw JouPNAL for February, 1917, Mr. Charles P. Sanger
examines the recent cases of In re Park's Settlement,' In re Bullock's
Will Trusts,2 and In re Garnham,3 and suggests that the limitations
which caused the difficulty in In re Park's Settlement and In re Bul-
lock's Will Trusts were valid, not for the reasons given by Sargant, J.,
in the latter case, but on the ground that in applying the rule in
Whitby v. Mitchell to any particular case, actual and not possible
events are to be considered. This ingenious suggestion has, it is sub-
mitted, two defects: in the first place, it assumes that the rule in
Whitby v. Mitchell applies to such cases as In re Park's Settlement and
In re Bullock's Will Trusts, and in the second place, it is inconsistent
with the origin and objects of the rule.
STATEMENT OF THE RULE IN WHITBY V. MITCHELL
The rule in Whitby v. Mitchell forbids the limitation of land to an
unborn person and his issue in succession.4 You cannot limit an
[914] i Ch. 595.
'[19r5] x Ch. 493-[igi6] 2 Ch. 413.
'In some text-books of great repute, the rule is said to forbid the limitation
of a remainder to the unborn child of an unborn child of an existing person:
Farwell, Powers (2d ed.) 2W6: Sugden, Powers (8th ed.) 2. This is quite
inaccurate, for if land is limited to A. for life with remainder to the eldest
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estate to an unborn person for life with remainder to the issue of that
unborn person.5 Consequently if land is limited to A., a living person,
for life with remainder to X., a person then unborn, for life, with
remainder to the issue of X., this last remainder is void.
In In re Park's Settlement the limitations were in effect to A.,
a living person for life, with remainder to X., an unascertained and
possibly unborn person, for life, with remainder to the children'of A.;
Eve, J., held that the remainder to the children of A. infringed "the
rule against limiting land to an unborn child for life with remainder
to his -unborn child." At first sight it is a little difficult to under-
stand how a limitation to the children of a living person can be
a limitation to the children of an unborn person. The mystery,
however, is partly explained by the fact that in In re Park's
Settlement X. was the widow (if any) whom A. might leave
surviving him; there was therefore a "double," not to say a
"treble," possibility that A. might marry a woman unborn at
the date of the settlement, and have children by her; and in that
case, if she survived her husband, the limitation to the children fol-
lowing her life estate would, as Eve, J., put it, "offend against what
has been called the rule against double possibilities, but what is more
accurately described .... as the rule against limiting land to an
unborn child for life with remainder to his unborn child": in other
words against the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell. This line of argument
shows the mischief which is done by that misleading expression, "the
rule against double possibilities." There is, as will presently be
explained, a rule which prohibits the limitation of successive con-
tingent remainders, but there is no general rule against double possi-
bilities.
It is fortunate for the credit of the law that In re Park's Settlement
has been over-ruled by the decisions in In re Bullock's Will Trusts
and In re Garnham. The reasoning of Sargant, J., in the former
case shows conclusively, it is submitted, that such cases as In re Park's
Settlement, In re Bullock's Will Trusts and In re Garnham, in each
of which the ultimate limitation was to the children of a living person,
are not within the letter of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, and the
history of the r-ule shows that they are not within its spirit
As for the remark of Younger, J., in In re Clarke's Settlement"
(which Mr. Sanger cites with tacit approval), expressing regret "that
the American view has not prevailed in this country [England] and
grandson of B., a bachelor, this is perfectly good. The error arose from the
absurd suggestion that a limitation which infringes the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell involves a possibility on a possibility.
'Per Kay, J., in Whitby v. Mitchell (1889) 42 Ch. D. "494, 5oo; affirmed by
the Court of Appeal (i89o) 44 Ch. D. 85.
1 [xgx6] i Ch. 467.
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that a rule so artificial and now without defenders or necessity [mean-
ing the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell] has not been abrogated by the
more modem rule against perpetuities," it may be pointed out that the
remark does not display any great amount of knowledge on the sub-
ject. So far as the present writer is aware, there is no American
decision with reference to the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell;7 if there
had been any decision to the effect that the rule in question has been
abrogated by the modem rule against perpetuities, Mr. J. C. Gray
would hardly have failed to chronicle the fact." On the other hand,
the legislature of Massachusetts has recently passed a statute-declar-
ing that remainders shall in future be governed by the rule against
perpetuities, "exclusively of any other supposed rule respecting limita-
tions to successive generations or double possibilities." It seems
unlikely that the legislature would have taken this trouble if the rule
in Whitby v. Mitchell had been treated as "abrogated" by the
American courts. And as for the rule being "artificial and without
necessity," the learned judge is respectfully advised to read the
Third Report of the Real Property Commissioners; he will perhaps
then be able to understand the necessity for the rule and its great
practical importance when it was first laid down.
POLICY OF THE RULE IN WHITBY V. MITCHELL
Independently of the question whether the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell applies to such cases as In re Park's Settlement and In re
Bullock's Will Trusts, Mr. Sanger makes the suggestion that, in every
case to which the rule applies, we must have regard to actual and
not to possible events. Speaking with all respect, the suggestion
seems inconsistent with the origin and object of the rule.
Mr. Sanger argues by analogy. He points out that a legal con-
tingent remainder (assuming it to be valid in its creation) does not
fail if in the result it vests at or before the determination of the
particular estate; in other words, the question whether it will take
effect or not depends on actual and not on possible events. Mr.
Sanger argues that the same principle applies to all rules governing
legal contingent remainders, and that where land is limited to X.,
'The case of Whitby v. Mitchell is not even mentioned in the chapter on
"Perpetuities" in Mr. Alfred G. Reeves' Real Property, Special Subjects (19O4)
referred to in complimentary terms by Mr. J. C. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.)
,267
,In the first edition of his Rule against Perpetuities published in I886, three
years before Whitby v. Mitchell was decided, Mr. J. C. Gray pronounced the
rule (established by that decision as a rule of long standing),to be "a nonexis-
tent rule based on an exploded theory," and he steadfastly maintained this
view until the last: Mr. J. C. Gray, Whitby v. Mitchell once more (1913) 29
LAw Qua. Rxv. 3o4.
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an unascertained person, for life, with remainder to his issue, and if
when X. is ascertained it turns out that he was born at the time when
the settlement took effect, the remainder to his issue is not invalidated
by the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell. It is extremely improbable that
the question will ever arise, because in ninety-nine cases out of a
hundred when land is limited to an unborn person, the limitation
takes the form of a limitation to the child of a named individual who
has no child at the time. In other words, the person to take under
the limitation is necessarily unborn at the date of the settlement. But
casting probabilities on one side, it is possible to imagine a case rais-
ing the point. Suppose a testator seised of land in fee simple
devises it to A., a living person, for life, with remainder, if he leaves
a widow surviving him, to that widow for life, with remainder to
her children born within twenty-one years after A.'s death. A.
marries a woman who was born in the testator's lifetime: she survives
A. and dies leaving- children born within the required period; whether
they are children by A. or by a subsequent husband is immaterial. Is
the devise to the children good? Mr. Sanger says "Yes." The
present writer ventures to think that in the particular case the limita-
tions to the widow and children would be successive legal contingent
remainders, and that the devise to the children would be bad under
the rule recognized by the Court of King's Bench in Chapman v.
Brown.9 If, however, the limitations were equitable, the rule in Chap-
man v. Brown would not apply, and it is submitted that the devise to
the children would be good, because the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell
was never intended to apply to such a case.
However this may be, there seem to be two answers to Mr. Sanger's
theory that the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell is like the rule requiring a
contingent remainder to vest in due time, and that its operation there-
fore depends on actual and not on possible events.
In the first place, the two rules compared by Mr. Sanger rest on
different principles. The rule requiring a legal contingent remainder
to. vest at or before the determination of the particular estate, and
allowing it to take effect if in the result it does so vest, is a technical
rule derived from the doctrine of seisin. It does not apply to
equitable contingent remainders.
"The reason why a contingent remainder under a legal devise
failed, if at the death of the previous holder of the estate of freehold
there was no person who answered the description of the remainder-
man next to take, was the feudal rule that the freehold could never
be vacant, for that there must always be a tenant to render the services
to the lord, and therefore if the remainder could not take effect
immediately on the determination of the prior estate, it never could
take effect at all. This result of feudal rules was never held to apply
*Post, p. 985 et seq.
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to equitable estates, and it was sometimes said that the legal estate in
the trustee supported the remainder. That was not the best mode of
expressing the doctrine, the principle really being that as the legal
estate in the trustees fulfilled all feudal necessities, there being always
an estate of freehold in existing persons who could render the ser-
vices to the lord, there was no reason why the limitations in remainder
of the equitable interest should not take effect according to the inten-
tion of the testator. If, at the time of the determination of the prior
equitable estate of freehold, there was no person capable of taking, a
person afterwards coming into existence within the limits of the rule
of remoteness, and answering the terms of the gift, was allowed to
take."1 0
And in the sime case, Lord Justice Cotton remarked that "in
equity the feudal rules of tenure will not be allowed to defeat the
trusts which the testator has declared by his will."'"
The rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, on the other hand, is quite different
in its origin and object. It has nothing to do with feudal doctrines ;12
it had its origin in the well-grounded fear of perpetuities caused by the
persistent endeavors of landowners in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries to make perpetual settlements by limiting their land to unborn
generations for successive life estates. It is difficult for us at the
present day, even in England, to realize the dangers of unbarrable
entails, and to appreciate the "abhorrence" which they inspired in the
minds of the judges, 3 but no one who investigates the history of the
subject can have any doubt that what we call the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell was directed against attempts to create "perpetuities" or
unbarrable entails. This is explained with perfect dearness by the
Real Property Commissioners 4 and by Mr. Charles Fearne. 15 Mr.
Joshua Williams expressed the same idea when he said, in speaking
of the rule afterwards established by the decision in Whitby v.
Mitchell:
"*Per Jessel, M. X, in Abbiss v. Burney (x88r) 17 CI. D. 2II, 229.
'Ibid. 231.
' The reader must not allow himself to be misled by the extraordinary state-
ment made by Lopes, L. J., in his judgment in Whitby v. Mitchell that the rule
established by that case was "an old rule originating out. of the feudal system."
In commenting on this statement Mr. T. Cyprian Williams remarked: "vVhat
a travesty of legal history is this I" Contingent Remainders and the Rule
against Perpetuities (1898) 14 LAw QuA. REv. 234, 244 The expression is
not too strong. The first suggestion of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell is to be
found at the end of the sixteenth century in the refusal of the courts to allow
"uses of perpetual freeholds." Charles Sweet, Limitations of Land to Unborn
Generations (913) 29 LAw QuAR. REv. 304, 3o7.
iS See 2 Bl. Com. 116; Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) 281. et seq.
1
,Third Report (1833) 29. The passage is printed in extenso in an article
by Charles Sweet, The Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell (1912) 72 COLUmBIA LAW
Rxv. i99, 2o4-5.
IContingent Remainders, 502: also printed at p. 2ox of the article referred
to in note 14, and in 29 LAw QuAp. REV. 304, 3X7.
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"It may not be sufficient to restrain every kind of settlement which
ingenuity might suggest, but it is directly opposed to the great motive
which usually induces attempts at a perpetuity, namely the desire of
keeping an estate in the same family and it has accordingly been
hitherto found sufficient.1 16
Mr. Burton states the law in similar language:
"Life estates may by law be given in succession to any number of
persons in existence, and ulterior estates in succession to their children
yet unborn ...... .But no remainder can be given to the child of
a person who is not in existence. For if this were once allowed, no
limit could be assigned to the extension of contingent remainders
through the remotest generations, and it would be easy to accompany
these, for their preservation, with other remainders to persons ascer-
tainable in due time as trustees, so as to make the settlement perpetual:
and thus all the political inconveniences which attended entails in their
first creation would be renewed.117
In other words, the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, like all rules directed
against attempts to make property inalienable, is a rule of public
policy, and when a limitation or other disposition of property offends
against a rule of public policy it is void ab initio, without regard to
actual events. As Mr. Charles Fearne puts it, such a limitation "is by
our courts considered void in its creation; as in the case of a limita-
tion of lands in succession, first to a person in esse, and after his
decease to his unborn children, and afterwards the children of such
unborn children, this last remainder is absolutely void." '18 When
Mr. Charles Fearne says that it is "absolutely void" he means that it
is void ab initio, and that no subsequent event can make it good. This
quality of being a rule of public policy distinguishes the rule in Whitby
v. Mitchell from the rule allowing a legal contingent remainder to
take effect if it vests at or before the determination of the preceding
estate of freehold. The latter rule does not involve any question of
public policy; it is a technical rule derived from feudal doctrines.
In the second place, Mr. Sanger is evidently under the impression
that the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell was originally designed to restrict
the creation of contingent remainders, and that it only applies to them.
for he describes it as "an old rule dealing with contingent remainders."
In this he appears to have been misled by the only statement of the
rule which is given by Mr. Charles Butler, namely, that "if land is
limited to an unborn person during his life, a remainder cannot be
limited so as to confer an estate by purchase on that person's issue !"19
"Real Property (3d ed.) 227 (i2th ed.) 274. The passage does not appear
in the editions published in more recent years.
'Burton, Compendium, 255.
'
8 Fearne, Cont. Rem. (1826) 502.
"Note to Fearne, Cont. Rein. (ioth ed.) 565.
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Similar statements of the rule are given by Mr. Joshua Williams,"0
Mr. Burton2 1 and Mr. Stephen M. Leake. 21 And it is true that the
first example given by Mr. Fearne of the application of the rule is a
limitation by way of remainder:
"In the case of a limitation of lands in succession, first to a person
in esse, and after his decease to his unborn children, and afterwards
the children of such unborn children, this last remainder is absolutely
void." 23
But it is to be noted, first, that this passage occurs not in that part
of Mr. Fearne's work which treats of contingent remainders, but in
that part which deals with executory interests; second, that he
begins by saying that the rule applies to "any limitation in future
or by way of remainder;" and third, that as a further illustration
of the application of the rule he cites Humberston v. Humberston,'
4
where lands were demised to a corporation upon trust to convey them
to certain persons and their male descendants one after another suc-
cessively in perpetuity, so that no one should take more than an estate
for life; these trusts, which were certainly not contingent remainders,
were held to infringe the rule in question, because, in the language
of Mr. Fearne, they tended to create a perpetuity or unbarrable
entail, 25 but in order to give effect to the testator's intention as far as
possible (cy-prbs) the first unborn sons were held to take ordinary
barrable estates tail.
The devise in Humberston v. Humberston was one of many attempts
made to create unbarrable estates tail by limiting successive estates
for life to unborn generations. At first it was hoped that this might
be done by way of use, but the courts soon held that such uses were
not executed by the statute.28  Shortly afterward, when executory
bequests of terms of years were held to be valid, attempts were made
to bequeath them in strict settlement to named persons and the heirs
of their bodies. Entails of this kind, if they had been lawful, would
"Real Prop. (12th ed.) 274.
" Compendium, 256.
'Prop. in Land (st ed.) 333-4.
Cont. Rem. (1826) 502.
"(0716) I P. Wims. 332.
' In the last edition of his Rule against Perpetuities, i66, note, Mr. J. C. Gray
did me the honor of accepting this explanation of Humberston V. Humberston
as accurate, but he could not bring himself to see that the doctrine of cy-prks
is an exception to the rule forbidding the creation of unbarrable entails, and
not to the modem rule against perpetuities: see Rule against Perpetuities,
65o; Charles Sweet, Limitations of Land to Unborn Generations (1913) 29 LAw
QUAP. REv. 304.
Charles Sweet, Limitations of Land to Unborn Generations (1913) 29 LAw
Qux&- REv. 307 et seq.
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have been unbarrable, but the courts refused to allow them.2 7  Then
the experiment was tried of devising land to trustees in fee upon
trust for certain persons and their male issue or descendants forever,
each to take for 99 years if he should so long live ;28 or of limiting
land in strict settlement by way of entail, subject to a term of iooo
years vested in trustees upon trust, in the event of any tenant in tail
barring the entail, to raise £50oo and pay it to the person next in
remainder.2 9  These experiments failed. Another device was to settle
land in strict settlement subject to a power of revocation given to
trustees, with a direction that on the birth of a tenant in tail they
should reduce his estate to a tenancy for life with remainder to his
sons in tail, "and thus by creating a succession of estates for life by
way of substitution for the original estates tail to create a direct
perpetuity. This contrivance also failed of effect."' ' o
It is therefore clear that the principle on which the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell is based applies to executory trusts of freeholds,'31 to rever-
sionary equitable terms of years,3 2 to appointments under powers,2 3
and to executory bequests of long terms,34 as well as to contingent
remainders. It has been decided that it applies to equitable contingent
remainders. 5
Why, then, it may be asked, do such learned text-writers as Charles
Butler, Burton, Joshua Williams and Leake state the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell as one which applies only to contingent remainders? The
answer is that Mr. Charles Butler introduced confusion into the sub-
ject by mixing up two doctrines supposed to have been laid down in
Lord Coke's time-namely, the rule against remote possibilities or
contingencies, and the rule against double possibilities or a possibility
on a possibility. It requires some patience to unravel the tangle.
'Leventhorpe v. Ashbie (1635) I Roll Abr. Devise L, pl. i. In Stanley v.
Leigh (1732) 2 P. Wins. 686 where an entail of this kind was attempted, Jekyll,
M. R., remarked that "the law does equally abhor a perpetuity" whether the
subject of it is land held in fee simple or land held for a long term of years.2 Beard v. Westcott (1813) 5 Taunt J93; Somerville v. Lethbridge (1795)
6 T. R. 213.
"Mainwaring v. Baxter (i8o0) 5 Ves. 458.
"Real Prop. Commissioners, Third Report, 30. Cf. Duke of Marlborough v.
Godolphin (759) 1 Eden, 404.
n Humberston v. Humberston, supra, note 25.
'Beard v. Westcott and Somerville v. Lethbridge, supra, note 28.
' Duke of Marlborough v. Godolphin, supra, note 30.
" Stanley v. Leigh, supra, note 27.
NMonypenny v. Dering (1852) 2 DeG. M. & G. i45; In re Nash [igio] 1 Ch.
i. If it had been a technical rule applying to legal contingent remainders,
there would have been no reason to extend it to equitable contingent remain-
ders, for they are subject to the modern rule against perpetuities.
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VARIETIES OF POSSIBIITIES
There is a certain ambiguity in the term "possibility," because some-
times it means a contingent or uncertain event, and at other times an
interest in property which depends on a contingency. Thus a con-
tingent remainder is not an estate, but the possibility of having an
estate at some future time.6'
We find in the old books at least three distinct doctrines with regard
to possibilities laid down or suggested:
I. In the Rector of Chedington's Case,3 7 Popham, C. J.. said that
a lease for years could not commence "upon a contingent which
depended upon another contingent," but the case was decided on
other and quite sufficient grounds, and Popham's dictum, so far from
being supported by the authority which he cites,38 was treated as
inaccurate by Lord Coke 9 and by Lord Nottingham, who said :40
"That there may be a possibility upon a possibility, and that there
may be a contingency upon a contingency, is neither unnatural nor
absurd in itself, but the contrary rule given as a reason by my Lord
Popham in the Rector of Chedingtonfs Case looks like a reason of
art, but in truth has no kind of reason in it, and I have known that
rule often denied in Westminster Hall."
The correct opinion seems to be that there is no general principle
of law which invalidates a limitation on the ground that it involves
a possibility on a possibility. There are, however, two specific rules
which have this effect:
(a) Estates upon condition. In former days, before the intro-
duction of uses and trusts and before contracts were specifically
enforceable in equity, conditions were used to create future estates.
But the courts kept a watchful eye upon them lest they should be
used to restrict the free alienation of land.4" Hence Lord Coke lays
down the rule that, if an estate is granted subject to the performance
of a condition, a further estate cannot be granted to take effect on
the performance of an additional condition, because the first estate
is "but in contingency, which is not a foundation upon which a greater
[estate] can increase, for a possibility cannot increase upon a possi-
bility."' 2 This doctrine is now of no practical importance, because
the desired result can generally be attained by means of a use, trust,
" Challis, Real Prop. (3d ed.) 76.
"T (x598) 1 Co. 153 a, x56 a.
"See Gray, Perpetuities, sec. 126.
"Blandford v. Blandford (675) i Rolle R. 38, 32r.
*Duke of Norfolk's Case (1647) 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 29.
Charles Sweet, Restraints on Alienation (July, 1917) 33 Lw QuAv. RE7.
236, 237.
a The Lord Stafford's Case (i6o9) 8 Co. 73 a, 75 a.
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or covenant, subject of course to the restrictions imposed by the
modem rule against perpetuities.
(b) Successive contingent remainders. In 1694 a testator whodesired that his lands should continue in his name and blood "solong as it shall please God to permit the same," devised them to his
nephew William Brown, son of the testator's brother Reginald Brown,for his life, with remainder to his sons in tail male, with remainder
to the second son of Reginald Brown for life, and after the death of
such second son then to the first son of the body of such second son
of Reginald Brown and to the heirs male of the body of such second
son. Thomas Brown, the second son of Reginald Brown, was born
after the testator's death, but during the life of William Brown, whodied without having had a son; the devise to Thomas Brown as the
second son of Reginald therefore took effect, but the question arose
whether he took an estate for life or an estate in tail male. The case
was submitted to several learned counsel, who differed in their views.Mr. Wilbraham's opinion, dated October 29th, 1746, is instructive:-
"I take it clearly that the testator intended to limit his estate to thesecond son of Reginald unborn, and that he intended to make himtenant for life, with a contingent remainder to his first and othersons in .tail.'3 This I think is not within the rules of law, for thoughthe law may allow a contingent remainder possibly for one life, yetI incline to think that it will not allow a contingent remainder upona contingent remainder, so that the limitation to the first son of thesecond son of Reginald, I think, was not legal; for the limitation tothe second son of Reginald was a contingent remainder, and if thelaw should allow another contingent remainder to be limited uponthe first, the law might allow another upon that, and so on in infinitum,
which would lock up real property longer than the policy of the lawwill admit, and would tend to perpetuity. I therefore incline to thinkthat the limitation to the first son of the second son of Reginald,which second son was not then in esse, was not a legal but a voidlimitation. If this limitation be a void limitation, then leaving out orrejecting it, the limitation will run thus 'to the second son of Reginaldfor life and to the heirs male of the body of such second son law-fully to be begotten,' which would I think create an estate tail."'14
The case subsequently came before the courts and they decided itin accordance with the opinion of Mr. Wilbraham and Mr. Booth.The Court of King's Bench said that even if they supplied the omissionin the will by inserting a limitation to the heirs of the body of thefirst son of Thomas, this would not effectuate, but defeat, the inten-
tion of the testator, because such a limitation would be void. Both
'It was clear from the whole frame of the will that some words had beenaccidentally omitted after the devise to the first son of the body of the secondson of Reginald, and that the testator intended to give him an estate in tail
male.
" Cases and Opinions, ii, 427 Mr. Booth was of the same opinion: ibid. 42&.
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Lord Mansfield and Wilmot, J., said that a possibility cannot be
limited upon a possibility.4 5 Now a contingent remainder, as everyone
knows, is not an estate, but the possibility of having an estate at some
future time; and therefore in saying that a possibility cannot be
limited upon a possibility, what the learned judges meant was that
a contingent remainder cannot be limited so as to follow and be
dependent on the vesting of a preceding contingent remainder. As
Thomas Brown was unborn at the testator's death, the devise to him
was contingent, and although it vested on his birth, the succeeding
contingent remainder which the testator intended to give to his eldest
son was beyond the limits allowed by law for the creation of such
possibilities, and was therefore void. That this is the true doctrine
is clear from, the opinion given by Mr. Yorke in advising on a later
case in which he thus stated the law :46
"A contingent remainder must vest during the life or immediately
upon the death of the devisee of the particular estate which precedes
it, such devisee being in esse at the time when the will speaks, but it
cannot be made to wait or expect the vesting of another estate, prior
in limitation and equally contingent with itself. The law does not
allow a contingency to depend upon a contingency, or one possibility
to be thus raised upon another."
It is submitted that In re Frost,4 T referred to in Mr. Sanger's article,
was rightly decided on the ground that the limitations in that case
involved successive contingent remainders. 48
II. Lord Coke has some remarks with regard to limitations of
estates tail, which but for the great reputation of their author might
fitly be described as arrant nonsense:
"If lands be given to a man which hath a wife and to a woman
which hath a husband and the heires of their two bodies, they have
presently [that is, immediately] an estate taile, for the possibility that
they may marry . . . But if lands be given to a man and two
women and the heires of their bodies begotten, in this case they have
a joynt estate for life and every of them a severall inheritance,
because they cannot have one issue of their bodies, neither shall there
be any construction a possibility upon a possibility, viz. , that he shall
marry the one first and then the other." '
I Chapman v. Brown (1765) 3 Burr. 1626, aff'd. by the House of Lords in
accordance with the unanimous opinion of the judges: 3 Bro. P. C. 269. It is
remarkable that the doctrine which we call the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell was
not referred to. See Charles Sweet, The Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell (19o9) 25
LAw QuAR. REv. 385, 397-8.
Ccses and Opinions, ii, 440.
4 (1889) 43 Ch. D. 246.
' Williams, Real Prop. (22d ed.) 422.
Co. Litt. 25 b. There is a passage at 184 a to the same effect, and in
Lampet's Case (1iso) io Co. 46 b, 5o b, Lord Coke develops the point at
some length.
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It is indeed obvious that they cannot have one issue of their bodies;
this is a sufficient explanation of the construction put upon the limita-
tion, and it is difficult to see why Lord Coke should drag in the doctrine
of a possibility on a possibility, for supposing that the man married
first the one woman and then the other, and had a child by each of
them, how could this affect the question?
The truth is that the question in the case supposed by Lord Coke
is purely a question of construction, and the rule stated by him is
an instance of the willingness of the judges in early days to adopt a
benignant construction in order to give effect to the presumed inten-
tion of the parties.
III. In Cholmley's Case,50 the judge laid down the doctrine that a
contingent remainder cannot be limited on a remote possibility.
"A possibility which shall make a remainder good ought to be a
common possibility and potentia propinqua, as death, or death with-
out issue, or coverture, or the like. And therefore as the logician
saith, potentia est duplex, remota et propinqua; the remainder to a
corporation which is not at the time of the limitation of the remainder,
is void, although such be erected afterwards during the particular
estate, for it was potentia remota; and this plainly appears in a com-
mon case in our books. If a lease be made for life, the remainder to
the right heirs of J. S., this is good, for by common possibility J. S.
may die during the life of the tenant for life; but if at the time of
the limitation of the remainder, there is no such J. S., but during thelife of the tenant for life J. S. is born and dies, his heir shall never
take."
It will be noticed that there is not a word here about a double
possibility, or a possibility on a possibility, for when it is said that
potentia est duplex, remota et propinqua, this of course means that
possibilities are of two kinds, remote and near.5 ' Yet for some reason
which has never been explained, our most learned real property
lawyers persist in regarding the case put by Lord Coke of a remainder
limited to the heirs of J. S., a nonexistent person, as one ihvolving
a double possibility or possibility on a possibility, the reason given
being that
"it amounts to the concurrence of two several contingencies . . .
first that such a person as J. S. should be born, which is very uncer-
tain, and secondly that he should also die during the particular estate,
" (1597) 2 Co. 50, 51 b.
' The reader must not resent this somewhat obvious explanation of the mean-
ing of duplex; that it is not wholly uncalled for appears from the fact that
even so learned a writer as Mr. Joshua Williams thought that duplex meant
"double;" for in commenting on the doctrine laid down in Cholmley's Case,
Mr. Williams says that "the chance that a married woman shall have a son
named Geoffrey is stated to be a double or remote possibility," as if "double"
were the same as "remote." There is not a word about double possibilities in
ChoImley's Case.
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which is another uncertainty grafted upon the former. This is called
a possibility upon a possibility, which Lord Coke tells us is never
admitted by intendment of law.' 52
The learned writer does not seem to have noticed that his explana-
tion does not fit the first example given by the court in Cholmley's Case
of a remote possibility, namely that of a limitation to a nonexistent
corporation; there is no possibility upon a possibility here.. Mr.
Fearne's explanation is a blunder, pure and simple.
The real reason why the judges in the sixteenth century were afraid
of remote possibilities was that at that time contingent remainders
were of comparatively recent introduction, for they were unknown to
the original common law,54 and the judges were apprehensive that
they might be made use of for the purpose of tying up land by
restricting its alienation. This fear proved to be groundless, partly
because every contingent remainder was liable to be destroyed by the
owner of the particular estate, and partly because the doctrine of
seisin made it necessary that every contingent remainder should vest
at or before the determination of the particular estate. It follows
from this latter rule that the nature of the contingency on which a
remainder is limited to take effect is quite immaterial, for whether
the event is almost a certainty or whether it is wildly improbable, the
period within which it must happen is the same; if it happens at
or before the determination of the particular estate the remainder
takes effect, otherwise the remainder fails, but in neither case does
the improbability or remoteness of the contingency postpone the
vesting, or affect the alienability of the land. It is not clear at what
period this simple truth dawned upon the judicial mind," but it must
have been before 1843, for in that year Lord St. Leonards, in a
passage which has puzzled those who fail to connect it with the
doctrine suppnosed to be laid down in Cholmley's Case, stated clearly
that the doctrine of remote possibilities had long ceased to be a rule
of English law."'
'Fearne, Cont. Rem. 251; Third Report of Real Prop. Comm. 29; 1 Preston,
Abstracts, 128. Even Mr. J. C. Gray, usually so critical and clear-sighted,
makes the same blunder: Perpetuities, 191.
" "The true ground . . . seems to be that the gift to a corporation while in
fact no such corporation exists . . . is void for want of capacity or uncer-
tainty." Preston, Abstracts, i28.
"Littleton thought they were impossible, having regard to the doctrine of
seizure. See sec. 721, and Lord Coke's commentary.
"It was perceived by the Real Property Commissioners in 1833: Third
Report, 29.
"Cole V. Sewell (I843) 4 Dr. & Wal. r, 28-29. See Charles Sweet, The
Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell (igo9) 25 LAw Qu.3 REv. 385, 394; Charles Sweet,
Remoteness of Terms and Powers (914) 30 LAw QuAR. RE7. 66, 76.
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ERROR AND CONFUSION
Having regard to the very obvious criticisms to which the doctrine
of remote possibilities and the doctrine of a possibility upon a possi-
bility are open, it is difficult to understand, first, how Mr. Fearne
could have brought himself to repeat the obsolete nonsense uttered
by the judges in Cholmley's Case as establishing a rule still applying
to contingent remainders, and second, how he could have mixed up
this nonsense with the still greater nonsense written by Lord Coke
to explain the construction of a limitation to the heirs of the bodies
of a man and two women, for it is with reference to this latter ques-
tion that Lord Coke tells us, in the passages referred to by Mr. Fearne,
that a possibility upon a possibility is never admitted by intendment
of law." He does not use the expression with reference to contingent
remainders.
Mr. Charles Butler, in annotating Mr. Fearne's treatise, pointed out
that "the expression of a possibility upon a possibility, which in the
language of Lord Coke cited in this place5 is never admitted by
intendment of law, must not be understood in too large a sense," and
he went on to demonstrate that a remainder may validly be limited so
as to depend on a possibility upon a possibility,59 but he failed to
notice that Lord Coke does not use the expression with reference to
contingent remainders; the question whether a limitation to a man
and two women and the heirs of their bodies gives them an estate
for life or an estate tail has nothing to do with contingent remainders;
it is a mere question of construction.
Not content with this confusion, Mr. Butler, in a note on strict
settlements of land contained in the last edition of Mr. Fearne's
treatise, made confusion worse confounded. He pointed out, quite
accurately, that before the introduction of executory interests no ques-
tion of remoteness, or (as he calls it) perpetuity, could arise, because
future estates could only be created by way of remainder, and that
the remoteness of a remainder, however great, was no objection to it.
He went on to say :60
"The case of a possibility on a possibility may be considered as
exceptions from the rule. They proceeded on a different ground, and
gave rise to this important rule, that if land is limited to an unborn
person during his life, a remainder cannot be limited so as to confer
an estate by purchase on that person's issue."
'Ante, pp. 988-9.
Mr. Fearne's reference is to Co. Litt. 25 b, r84 a.
"Mr. Preston gave an instance of a remainder being validly limited on a
treble possibility: Abstracts, 128.
"Fearne, Cont. Rem. (ioth ed.) 565.
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It follows that Mr. Butler made three blunders:
(i) He mixed up Lord Coke's ridiculous theory that the reason
why a limitation to the issue of the bodies of three persons does not
give them a single estate tail is because it involves a possibility on a
possibility, with the doctrine laid down by the judges in Choimleys
Case (but now happily exploded) that a remainder cannot be limited
to take effect on a remote contingency.
(ii) He thought that the rule which we call the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell was derived from the curious mixture thus produced.
(iii) He therefore concluded that the rule in question only applies
to remainders.
In this singular combination of error, Mr. Butler has been followed
by many later writers on the law of real property.61
CONCLUSIONS
A careful study of the history of the subject leads, it is submitted,
to these conclusions:
I. There is no general principle of law that a limitation which
involves a possibility on a possibility is bad.
"The cases given in illustration of this [supposed doctrine] may
be easily accounted for on principles of law, without resorting to the
quaint and unintelligible terms of a possibility on a possibility."6 2
Two rules of the common law for which this doctrine is given as
the reason 3 are really due to the instinctive distrust of complicated
limitations entertained by the early judges. Since the invention of
the modem rule against perpetuities no extension of the doctrine in
question is likely to be made.6'
II. The rule in Whitby v. Mitchell has nothing to do with the
supposed rule against a possibility on a possibility. It is derived from
the general principle forbidding the creation of unbarrable entails,
which down to the time of Mr. Fearne were called "perpetuities." 6 5
'Williams, Real Prop. (i2th ed.) 272; Challis, Real Prop. (3d ed.) II6.
The present writer is constrained to admit that his respect for the distinguished
authors here criticized long prevented him from attempting to -solve the mystery.
a I Preston, Abstracts, z28.
' Supra, p. 985 et seq.
"In re Bowles [1902] 2 Ch. 65o.
' Accordimg to Mr. Fearne, the rule that if a life estate is given to an unborn
person no estate in remainder can be given to his issue, is an instance of the
application of the general principle that any limitation in future "which in its
nature tends to a perpetuity" is void in its creation: Cont. Rem. 502. Mr.
Fearne does not anywhere, it is believed, use "perpetuity" as equivalent to
"remoteness." No one who thinks that those terms were interchangeable in the
eighteenth century can understand Mr. Fearne's treatise.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
III. The rule in Whitby v. Mitchell is a rule of public policy,
being a branch of the general principle of law which forbids limita-
tions savoring of perpetuity or remoteness. Consequently every
limitation which infringes it is void ab initio, and subsequent events
cannot make such a limitation good.
It is difficult to predict how the courts will deal with the questions
raised by Mr. Sanger.. Having regard to the decision of the House
of Lords in Cadell v. Palmer,8 it may well be that our judges will
consider it conclusively settled that the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell does
not apply. to executory bequests of terms of years. On the other hand,
there seems no reason why our judges should abrogate the rule
recognized by the Court of King's Bench and apparently the House
of Lords in Chapman v. Brown, more especially as it justifies the
decision in In re Frost. Nor does it seem probable that any court
will adopt Mr. Sanger's suggestion that the application of the rule in
Whitby v. Mitchell depends on actual events, unless the court
altogether disregards the origin and object of the rule.
" (1833) 1 Cl. & F. 372. In an article on Contingent Remainders (Jan. 1917)
30 H~Av. L. Riv. 226, Mr. J. L. Thorndike points out that a series of executory
devises of a long term of years to unborn generations, confined within the
limits allowed by the rule against perpetuities, was held to be valid by the
House of Lords in Cadell v. Palmer. This decision upheld the judgment of
the court below, which was commented on by the Real Property Commissioners
in their Third Report, 33. The main question in Cadell v. Palmer was whether
the period of 21 years allowed by the modem rule against perpetuities must
have reference to the minority of a person taking under the settlement, or
whether it may be a term in gross: the House of Lords decided in favor of the
latter allowance. Mr. Gray says that "the result seems to have been arrived
at by accident rather than by any process of judicial reasoning," and else-
where refers to "the curious and illogical manner" in which this extension was
made. Perpetuities, ss. i86, 223. But he does not seem to have noticed that
the decision in Cadell v. Palmer was partly based on a misapprehension of
Beard v. Westcott; the limitations in that case were void because, as the
Real Property Commissioners and Mr. Fearne pointed out, they tended to
create a "perpetuity" in the sense of an unbarrable entail; they would have
been void if the modem rule against perpetuities had never been invented.
